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PASSENGER PROFILING: A GREATER
TERROR THAN TERRORISM ITSELF?
DONNA SMITH*
History teaches that grave threats to liberty often come in
times of urgency, when constitutional rights seem too
extravagantto endure.'
INTRODUCTION

In August of 1996, Laura Fadil booked a flight from Newark
to Haifa, Israel, to visit relatives she had never met.' As she
checked in at the ticket counter at El Al, Israel's national airline,
security personnel questioned her about her ethnicity and the
origin of the name "Fadil."3 Upon hearing that Fadil was an Arab
name, the security personnel subjected Laura to a litany of
intrusive questions.4 At the end of this interrogation, and after
inviting the security personnel to conduct a hand search of her
belongings, Laura was labeled a "security risk" and the security
personnel refused to allow her to board the plane.' Laura never
boarded that El Al flight, or any other flight to Israel that day.
Instead, El Al arranged for her to fly with another airline the next
day.6
Laura was singled out because she "fit the profile." 7 Laura
displayed characteristics that led El Al security personnel to select
her as one likely to be a terrorist.8 Prior to 1972, a serious
*

J.D. Candidate, June 1999.

1. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 635 (1989)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
2. Sam Husseini, Making the Skies Safer; Profile in Unfairness; What
Happened to TWA 800 Is No Reason to Endanger Passengers' Civil Rights,
WASH. POST, Nov. 24, 1996, at C3.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. See also United States v. Meulener, 351 F. Supp. 1284, 1288 (C.D.
Ca. 1972) (explaining that the FAA developed a hijacker profile to assist
airport security personnel in determining those passengers who are most
likely to be hijackers, while allowing most passengers to pass through the
security checkpoints without delay).
8. See United States v. Cyzewski, 484 F.2d 509, 511 (5th Cir. 1973)
(weighing the burden of airport security measures against the need for

The John MarshallLaw Review

[32:167

increase in hijackings prompted the development of various preflight surveillance techniques, some of which we still use today,
including magnetometers 9 and passenger profiling. 10 Though most
of the criteria used to assess an individual's profile remain
classified in an effort to avoid undermining the system, some
criteria are available through public documents or are reported by
government aviation officials." Airport security personnel may
enhanced security measures). When the profile is applied and a passenger fits
the criterion, airport security personnel will classify the individual as a
"selectee." Id. Selectees are subjected to more intense screening procedures.
Id. The security personnel will request that the passenger answer questions
and/or produce identification. Id. If the security personnel have any doubt as
to the selectee's identity, the security personnel will continue to ask the
passenger questions and possibly insist that he or she pass through the
magnetometer. Id.
9. See United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 770 (4th Cir. 1972)
(explaining the operation
of magnetometers
and discussing their
constitutionality). Magnetometers are metal detecting devices, which security
personnel use to reveal metal concealed in carry-on luggage or in a passenger's
clothing. Id. A passenger passes through the magnetometer prior to boarding
the airplane. Id. If the magnetometer indicates the presence of metal, then
the security personnel will determine whether the passenger is carrying a
dangerous metal object by asking him what metallic items he is carrying or
asking him to empty the metallic contents of his pockets. Id. The passenger
will pass through the magnetometer again until he elicits no positive reading.
Id. The use of the magnetometer is generally considered to be an "electronic
search." Id. See also Klarfeld v. United States, 944 F.2d 583, 586 (9th Cir.
1991) (finding an attorney's constitutional rights were not violated when he
was required to walk through a magnetometer at the courthouse in his
stocking feet because his shoes contained metal). If a passenger is unable to
pass through a magnetometer, even after emptying the contents of his or her
pockets, the security personnel may then use a hand-held magnetometer to
perform a more thorough search. Id.
10. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, AIRLINE PASSENGER SECURITY
SCREENING: NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES vii (1996)
[hereinafter Passenger Screening Implementation Report] (considering the
non-technical issues and obstacles related to the implementation of the new
passenger security screening methods). The FAA enlisted the services of the
National Research Council to compile this report. Id. The National Research
Council gathered together a panel of "experts in human factors, risk
perception and psychology, imaging science, electrical engineering, chemical
detection, health effects of radiation, and legal issues." Id. at 11. The panel
heard presentations by experts on passenger screening technologies, read
technical literature provided by the FAA and the National Research Council,
and participated in workshops during which outside organizations presented
their suggestions.
Id.
The panel reviewed the recommended passenger
screening methods, assessed the potential concerns relating to each,
considered how the methods might be effectively implemented, and suggested
other methods for passengers who are unwilling to comply. Id. at vii. They
considered the security screening methods in light of health and privacy
concerns, travel comfort, effectiveness and public acceptance. Id.
11. Gregory T. Nojeim, Civil Liberties Implications Of Aviation Security,
PassengerProfiling (The Int'l Conference on Aviation Safety and Security in
the 21" Century) 3 (1997) (speaking on behalf of the American Civil Liberties
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select a passenger for increased security measures based on the
following variables: information contained in the passenger's
travel documents, the passenger's conduct, travel destination or
starting point, whether the flight is one way or round-trip, or on
the basis of forty or so other pieces of data, most of which remain
confidential.'"
It would be interesting to know what characteristics Laura
Fidel shared with a "typical" terrorist and what factors El Al
security personnel considered to come to that conclusion.
Certainly we may infer that her Arabic last name had some
bearing upon El Al's decision to subject Laura to such close
scrutiny and ultimately prohibit her from boarding the flight. Did
they take into account that she was a nursing student at Yale
University? 3 They must have. Why else would they have asked
her about her scholarship?14
Assuming that nationality is not a key factor in the formation
of a profile, the issue then becomes one of privacy.
How
comfortable is the typical passenger with the idea that, as they
move through an airport attending to the usual pre-travel
arrangements, airport personnel are compiling many bits of

Union concerning the privacy and discrimination issues associated with
passenger profiling). Mr. Nojeim is Legislative Council for the American Civil
Liberties Union's Washington National Office.
12. Id. Security personnel form a passenger profile based on both physical
characteristics, such as nervousness, sweating, or the amount of baggage
checked or carried, and information independent of the passenger's demeanor,
such as method of payment, whether the passenger is traveling alone and
whether the passenger will rent a car. Id. This is based on the profiling
system that the FAA is currently developing with Northwest Airlines for
domestic flights. Id. In United States v. Riggs, the airline personnel described
defendant as "a young female Negro wearing a brilliant orange coat and large
gold hoop earrings." United States v. Riggs, 347 F. Supp. 1098, 1100
(E.D.N.Y. 1972). They further noted that she had no baggage and bought
three one-way tickets for a flight from Detroit to New York with cash from a
brown paper bag. Id. The airline personnel also noted she was traveling with
two African American males. Id.

These factors as a whole were suspicious to

the security personnel, causing them to label her "a selectee pursuant to the
FAA 'behavioral profile' system." Id. In determining that a passenger fits a
terrorist profile, airport personnel are supposed to consider specific factors as
guidelines. An American Airlines ticket agent in United States v. Lopez-Pages
based his judgment on the facts that Lopez-Pages paid for his tickets in cash,
did not give a phone number, was Hispanic, was traveling within the range of
Cuba, bought two one-way tickets, and did not check any baggage. United
States v. Lopez-Pages, 767 F.2d 776, 778 (11th Cir. 1985). See also United
States v. Moreno, 475 F.2d 44 (5th Cir. 1973) (concluding the police were
justified in searching defendants when defendants lied to police officers, were
obviously nervous, changed lines at the ticket counter, later changed airlines,
and the defendant had a bulge in his pocket that led police to believe that he
was armed and dangerous).
13. Husseini, supra note 2, at C3.
14. Id.
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personal data with the ultimate goal of classifying each passenger
as threatening or non-threatening? If the passenger is unlucky
enough to fit the terrorist profile, the passenger may be merely
detained or embarrassed, or the inconvenience may rise to the
level of humiliation in the form of handcuffing, a strip search,15 or
the dumping of the passenger's luggage onto the floor of a public
area.16 Like Laura, the passenger may be denied the opportunity
to board altogether, no matter what level of indignity the
passenger is willing to withstand.
This Comment explores the method and implementation of
passenger profiling historically and analyzes its application in
concert with modern approaches and techniques. The ultimate
conclusion is that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
should not employ this procedure in its current format unless
modifications are implemented that would bring passenger
profiling in line with the protections afforded by the United States
Constitution. Part I provides a historical background of passenger
profiling, and how it has developed in this country, including the
FAA's influence on airport security.
Part I also examines
President Clinton's Commission on Aviation Safety and Security
and its efforts to develop a strategy for dealing with aviation
security concerns. Additionally, the commission's plans to use
passenger profiling in conjunction with new technology and its
efforts to address civil rights issues are analyzed in Part I. Part II
examines searches that result from the application of passenger
profiles in light of the Fourth Amendment. Part II also reviews
the Fourth Amendment exceptions that have traditionally served
to justify airport searches, including voluntary consent, "Terry"
stops and administrative searches, and suggests why these should
not apply to a search pursuant to a passenger profile. Part III
assesses the effectiveness of passenger profiling as a security
measure. Part IV analyzes the impact of passenger profiling on a
passenger's reasonable expectation of privacy. Part V proposes a
solution to the present problems with the implementation of the
passenger profiling system, including the redevelopment of the
profile criteria, creation of a civil rights panel, and improved
training procedures.

15. Id. Security personnel detained Abraham Ahmad in Oklahoma. Id.
His ultimate destination was Jordan, but because security personnel identified

him as a potential suspect in the Oklahoma City Bombing due to his ethnicity
and travel destination, he was held and questioned over a three day period.

Id. During that time he was made to answer questions about his religious
practices, handcuffed and strip searched. Id.
16. Council on American-Islamic Relations, CAIR Meets With Officials on
Passenger Profiling, *1 (Press Release
1997)
<http://www.cair-

net.org/cair/presses/press62697.htm>.
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I.

PASSENGER PROFILING, PAST AND PRESENT

This Part offers a foundation for examining how society
responds to the threat of terrorism by acquiescing to more invasive
security measures. A brief description of the development and
history of passenger profiling will provide a basis for
understanding profiling's ultimate objective, and how it is used in
conjunction with modern security approaches.
A.

The History of PassengerProfiling

In the late 1940's, a domestic dispute inspired a woman to
hire assassins to kill her husband.17 The assassins planted a bomb
on the Philippine Airlines plane that the husband was taking from
Daet to Manila. The success of this mission resulted in the first
commercial flight bombing recorded in history. '8
The first
commercial flight bombing in the United States occurred in 1955
when a passenger's son packed a bomb in the passenger's luggage
so that he could collect the proceeds from an insurance policy.19
The first United States commercial flight hijacking occurred
in 1961.20 This new form of terrorism became a source of national
anxiety when, in 1968, the United States became the target of
seventeen attempted hijackings.2 1 The first passenger profiling
procedure materialized during this period of panic and was
extremely ineffective in subverting terrorist activity.22 In fact, in
1972, the last year airport security personnel used profiles in this
country,
there
were
twenty-eight
hijackings.2
Once
magnetometers were developed, hijackings decreased to the point
that only two United States carriers have been hijacked in the
past eleven years.24
In response to the hijacking dilemma, the FAA and other
federal agencies collected and examined information on the
characteristics of known terrorists and hijackers. 2' Researchers
used this information to create a list of distinguishing
characteristics
that
would
differentiate
a
terrorist
for

17. Passenger Screening Implementation Report, supra note 10, at 9.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Nojeim, supra note 11, at *5. Profiling techniques are inadequate as a
security measure because those who don't fit the profile proceed unnoticed. Id.
at *4. "What terrorist profile would have picked up the seminary student
returning to his studies from a visit to his mother who was detained by law
enforcement officers in Florida ...when he tried to board an airplane with an
assortment of weapons that included hand grenades?" Id.
23. Id. at *5.
24. Id. One explosion occurred on Pan Am flight 103 and the other on a
TWA flight near Athens in 1986. Id.
25. United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667, 670 (2d Cir. 1972).
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identification purposes. 6
A scientific, sociological and
psychological foundation formed the basis for the profile. 7 Ideally,
airport personnel would effectively use the profile independently of
their own subjective interpretation. 8 While generally supporting
the profiling procedure, courts have recognized the potential for
the "serious abuse of individual rights."29
B. The Legal History of PassengerProfiling
The Airport Security Act empowers the FAA to implement
procedures designed to improve security technology. 6 Historically,
courts have supported the FAA in its efforts to implement new
technology or procedures, even when those procedures go further
than merely locating dangerous objects. 3
The Supreme Court tends to avoid ruling on broad cases
involving profiling, instead focusing on the specific facts of each
individual case. 2 With some notable limitations and exceptions,
federal and state courts accepted the use of passenger profiling
security measures when this issue first surfaced in the late 1960's
and early 1970's.33 Courts were resolute in noting, however, that
26. Id.

The traits of an individual, as well as the circumstances

surrounding the purchase of the ticket, are taken into consideration. Id.
27. Id. See United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1082 (E.D.N.Y.
1971) (explaining the basis for profiling and how an accurate profile is
developed). Researchers used visual and photographic studies of boarding air
passengers in conjunction with thorough investigations of known hijackers.
Id. The researchers found that hijackers were not "highly motivated or
resourceful" people and they displayed specific observable features that
differentiated them from the general traveling public. Id.
28. Bell, 464 F.2d at 670.
29. See id. at 676 (Mansfield, J., concurring) (comparing the use of a profile
in airport searches to searches of a home based on police hunches).
30. Passenger Screening Implementation Report, supra note 10, at 34.
31. Id. However, as the screening technology becomes more intrusive, the
legal problems associated with its use must be closely scrutinized. Id.
President Clinton's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism
recognizes that fundamental freedoms are threatened as security measures
increase. Id.
32. Robert Derocher, Friendly Skies? J. MARSHALL L. SCH. MAG. Summer
1997 40 at 46 (quoting Professor Timothy O'Neill, Criminal Law Professor,
The John Marshall Law School).
33. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. at 1101 (holding that evidence should be
suppressed in cases where airport personnel do not adhere to the formal
profile screening procedure). In Lopez, a Pan American Passenger Service
Manager "updated" the profile, eliminating one factor from the FAA official
profile and adding two additional categories. Id.
One of the characteristics added introduced an ethnic element for which
there is no experimental basis, thus raising serious equal protection
problems. The second added criterion called for an act of individual
judgment on the part of airline employees. The effect of these changes
was to destroy the essential neutrality and objectivity of the approved
profile.
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no matter how serious the hijacking problem, Constitutional
concerns could not be ignored.34 In the face of unexplained
disasters to come, however, individual rights could again be
threatened.
C. The Aviation Safety and Security Commission

On July 17, 1996, TWA Flight 800 exploded, leaving few clues
as to its cause.35 Theories ranged from a bomb smuggled on board,
to a surface-to-air missile fired from a ship,36 to an Islamic
fundamentalist attack. 7 Almost immediately, reports on the
insufficiency of the current aviation security and the need for
expensive new devices appeared in the newspapers, seemingly on
a daily basis.38 Not only in the United States, but across the world,
airport officials sought ways to render their airports
invulnerable.39
Against this backdrop of fear and uncertainty, President
Clinton established the White House Commission on Aviation
Safety and Security (Commission) and appointed Vice President
Gore to Chair the Commission." The Commission consisted of
Id. Accord Bell, 464 F.2d at 670 (stressing that an effective profile is one that
may be "objectively employed by the ticket seller without requiring any
subjective interpolation"); United States v. Ruiz-Estrella, 481 F.2d 723, 730
(2d Cir. 1973) (holding that evidence should be suppressed where defendant,
though he fit the profile, was not subjected to the magnetometer test and had
done nothing suspicious); People v. Kuhn, 33 N.Y.2d 203, 208 (N.Y. 1973)
(noting that defendant was only searched after he elicited a positive reading
from the magnetometer and that this procedure was applied to all passengers
passing through the magnetometer).
34. See Cyzewski, 484 F.2d at 511 (recognizing that warrantless airport
searches must be guided by the standard of reasonableness); see also United
States v. Moreno, 475 F.2d 44, 45 (5th Cir. 1973) (balancing an individual's
Fourth Amendment rights against public concern over the threat of hijacking).
35. Rick Hampson, TWA Flight 800 Explosion, FBI Exploring Terrorism
Theory. No Conclusions Reached Yet; Missile Pretty Much Ruled Out, CIN.
ENQUIRER, July 20, 1996 at Al.
36. Id. Just before the explosion, radar picked up a signal that led FBI
agents to believe that there might have been a missile involved. Id.
37. Derocher, supra note 32, at 41.
38. See Stephen C. Fehr, Pena Addresses Price of Airline Safety; Terrorism
May Force Massive Upgrade of System, Secretary Says, THE WASH. POST, Aug.
2, 1996 at A13 (commenting that conventional x-rays are no longer sufficient,
and that $4.2 billion would be needed to develop a bomb-detection system and
computerized bag matching system); see also Passenger Screening
Implementation Report, supra note 10, at 13-21 (describing the proposed
screening technologies, including "chemical trace-detection techniques that
can see through clothing").
39. Crash Launches New Talks on Security, J. REC., Aug. 26, 1996 at *1. In
explaining how Rome's Fiumicino International Airport has increased security
measures, Francesco Girasoli, a police security official at the airport said,
"[t]his happens during periods of emergency." Id.
40. Exec. Order No. 13,015, 3 C.F.R. 213 (1996).
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members from the public and private sectors, each contributing
some degree of security expertise. 4 The Commission had forty-five
days to develop a strategy for dealing with the aviation security
concerns.42 A proposal for automated passenger
profiling was
43
among the Commission's final recommendations.
Noting that "there is no silver bullet," the Commission
recommended that the federal government treat aviation as a
national security issue and allocate money to upgrade the entire
system." In October, 1996, in response to the Commission's
recommendations, Congress approved over $400 million to fund
the Commission's mandates."
The Commission suggested that passenger profiling could
"complement technology" by using information that is currently
stored on databases to personalize the profile.4" To support its
position, the Commission cited the use of profiling by other
agencies, such as the Customs Service, and recommended that the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) be involved in developing the most effective profiling
system possible. 47 Recognizing the civil liberties concerns certain
to arise from the implementation of many of the recommendations,
the commission sought the advice of a panel of leading civil
libertarians. 8
D. The Panel on PassengerScreening

The Panel on Passenger Screening (Panel) identified five nontechnical potential problem areas relating to new passenger
screening technologies. These include: health concerns, legal
issues, operational questions, privacy issues and passenger

41. Id.
42. Derocher, supra note 32, at 41.
43. Id. Other recommendations included the use of baggage matching
devices and baggage and body-screening technology. Id. These security
measures have the disadvantage of being expensive and time consuming and

are intended to be used in tandem with passenger profiling to limit the
number of passengers detained. Id.
44. Final Report to President Clinton, White House Commission on Aviation
Safety and Security, *1, *22 (1997). Congress agreed to the Commission's
initial request of approximately $160 million in federal funds for improvement
of safety systems. Id. The report further concluded that the federal

government should continue to designate around $100 million in funds each
year for the improvement of safety systems. Id.

45. Id. at *4.
46. Id. at *24-25. Profiling can help security personnel to effectively use
the technological and training advancements to their full potential. Id.

Security personnel could access information that is already in computer
databases to determine which passengers might pose a threat. Id.

47. Id. at *25.
48. Id.

1998]

PassengerProfiling

convenience.49 The Panel clearly identified the correlation between
the perceived risk to be avoided through passenger screening
methods and the level of intrusiveness that people are willing to
tolerate." For example, passengers are willing to undergo more
time consuming, exhaustive security procedures for an
international flight than a domestic flight because they perceive a
Interestingly, the Panel further
greater threat of danger.5'
identified acceptance of passenger screening procedures as a
"trade-off," between an individual's personal liberties and the
perceived threat of danger. 2 By this rationale, fear of terrorism,
whether founded in truth or not, could fuel the fire that envelopes
our civil rights. 3
The Panel relied on presentations by experts in the field of
aviation security, among them Dan Issacharoff, the former head of
security for El Al Airlines of Israel, in forming their conclusions. 4
El Al has developed a comprehensive security screening program
The
pursuant to which passengers are directly questioned.15
method that El Al uses to label potentially dangerous passengers
involves the categorization of five types of passengers. These
range from naive terrorists, who would not know that their
luggage concealed explosive devices, to suicide terrorists, who
would knowingly carry explosive devises with the intent to destroy
the airplane. 6
The Panel recommended that El Al's screening system, along
with the custom-made passenger interrogation technique the
airline has developed to fit each profile type, could serve as a
model for other air carriers.5 7 This may mean that what happened
49. Passenger Screening Implementation Report, supra note 10, at 1-2.
50. Id. at 52. The panel suggests that the FAA use this link between the
public's perception of the gravity of the threat and their tolerance of invasive
security measures to create a workable strategy for dealing with future

threats. Id.
51. Id. at 2. Similarly, passengers will tolerate increased security measures
when they believe that an unusual threat exists. Id. Cf. Timothy J. McNulty,
Trading Privacy for Security in Other Countries, Public Tamely Submits to
Required Indignities, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 21, 1995, at 15 (questioning the
individual acceptance of invasive security measures that are the direct result
of public reaction to terrorist activity). "Whether submitting to airport
interrogations, opening purses at the entrances to public buildings or
watching police runmage through toiletries, squeezing out toothpaste, life in
the name of security becomes a collection of personal indignities." Id. The

writer is concerned that fear of terrorism will turn into a panic that will
change the way we live and our willingness to assert our constitutional rights.

Id.
52. Passenger Screening Implementation Report, supra note 10, at 10.
53. Husseini, supra note 2, at C3.
54. Passenger Screening Implementation Report, supra note 10, at 13.

55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 14.
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to Laura Fadil could become a common occurrence on all airlines,
and that the aviation industry will even'praise such "passenger
interrogation" techniques. 8 "History reveals that the initial steps
in the erosion of individual rights are usually excused on the basis
of an 'emergency' or threat to the public. But the ultimate
strength of our constitutional guarantees lies in their unhesitating
application in times of crisis and tranquillity alike." 9
II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS OF A SEARCH
PURSUANT TO A PASSENGER PROFILE

The airport setting is a "critical zone" in which each
individual passenger poses an ominous threat to fellow passengers
and flight crews.6 ° As such, a more intrusive search is reasonable
in an airport setting than would be authorized for on-the-street6
encounters." 1

This broad discretion is not without limits.

Concerns over airport safety cannot justify the depravation of
constitutional safeguards.63
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution
ensures that "the right of people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause ...."" Some exceptions to the Fourth
Amendment applicable to the airport setting include searches
carried out with the consent of the person being searched, 9 less58. Husseini, supra note 2, at C3. Aviation officials repeatedly praise El Al
Airlines for their excellent security methods. Id. Further, El Al alumni train
other carriers to implement these methods. Id.
59. United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667, 676 (2d Cir. 1972) (Mansfield, J.,
concurring).
60. United States v. Moreno, 475 F.2d 44, 51 (5th Cir. 1973).
61. Id.
62. United States v. Cyzewski, 484 F.2d 509, 517 (5th Cir. 1973)
(Thornberry, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 515 (Thornberry, J., dissenting).
64. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
65. People v. Heimel, 812 P.2d 1177, 1181 (Colo. 1991). A passenger may
choose to leave a security checkpoint area before the actual screening process
begins. Id. When a passenger approaches the security checkpoint area with
notice that a screening process may lead to a search of his person or luggage,
and the screening process actually begins, the passenger consents to the
search. Id. See also United States v. Lopez-Pages, 767 F.2d 776, 778 (11th
Cir. 1985) (noting that when the passenger voluntarily approaches an airport
security area, no probable cause or even reasonable suspicion is required to
search that passenger). A "mere suspicion of possible illegal activity" is
adequate justification for a search under such circumstances. Id.; People v.
Kuhn, 33 N.Y.2d 203, 208 (N.Y. 1973) (holding that defendants' voluntary
consent to be searched is a waiver of their Fourth Amendment rights absent
evidence of coercive tactics by security personnel). Evidence of coercive
questioning methods may be determined by the nature of the questions or the
location where the questioning took place. Id. But see McGann v. Northeast
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intrusive "Terry" searches," and administrative searches. 7 This
Part describes each of these Fourth Amendment exceptions, and
explains how they are inapplicable to a search pursuant to the
utilization of a passenger profile. However, before addressing the
question of whether a Fourth Amendment exception applies, the
first step is to determine that a search pursuant to a passenger
profile is a "government" search.
A. Government or Private Search?
The threshold issue in determining whether an airline
security search comes within the limitations of the Fourth
Amendment is whether the government is responsible for the
Ill. Reg'l Commuter R.R. Corp., 8 F.3d 1174, 1179 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting other
courts' holdings that the decision to use air transport implies consent to the
search of the passengers person or luggage); United States v. PulidoBaquerizo, 800 F.2d 899, 901 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that passengers
impliedly consent to a visual inspection and limited search of their luggage
when they place the luggage on the magnetometer conveyor belt).
66. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968). Terry gives police officers the
authority to conduct a self-protective search of an individual to check for
weapons where the officer has reason to believe the individual may be armed
and dangerous. Id. The officer need not show probable cause or be positive
the individual is carrying a weapon. Id. The standard for determining an
officer's reasonableness is an objective standard, based on whether a
reasonably prudent person in the officer's position would be justified in
determining that his safety and/or the safety of others was threatened. Id.
The scope of this authority is very narrow and not justifiable unless the officer
has a reasonable apprehension of danger. Id. This limited search is not to be
used to discover evidence that is not reasonably related to the discovery of
"guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault of the police
officer." Id. at 29. Any weapon seized in accordance with this limited search
"may properly be introduced into evidence against the person from whom they
were taken." Id. at 31. The officer must be able to articulate rational
inferences, stemming from specific facts which would justify the search. Id. at
21.
67. United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 908 (9th Cir. 1973). An
administrative search is defined as a search conducted for an administrative
purpose, rather than to obtain evidence of a crime. Id. Administrative
searches are an exception to the Fourth Amendment in that probable cause is
not a necessary component of the search process. Id. General searches for
evidence of crime are a prohibited application of the administrative search
authority. Id. at 909. As such, evidence obtained from a general search is
inadmissible. Id. An administrative search must be reasonable as mandated
by the Fourth Amendment standard. Id. at 910. To meet the test of
reasonableness, an administrative search must implement the least intrusive
means possible to accomplish the administrative end which justifies the
search. Id. The search must be limited to the discovery of weapons or
explosives and must be minimally invasive to determine the presence or
absence of those items. Id. at 913. The authority to conduct a valid
administrative search is counterbalanced by the passenger's right to avoid the
search by choosing not to board the airplane. Id. at 910-11. Whether the
passenger was aware of his right to refuse is only one component in assessing
the reasonableness of the search. Id. at 914.
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search.68 The Fourth Amendment applies only to government
searches, not searches carried out by a private entity. 69 However,
a search is considered a government search for purposes of the
Fourth
Amendment
when
the
government
contributes
significantly to any phase of the search, including the planning
stages. 0
Without question, the United States has played a
substantial role in airport security measures since the threat of
hijacking first became an exigent concern in 1968.71 Since the
early days of the hijacking crisis of 1968, the government's level of
involvement in airport security measures has been so extensive as
to bring any search conducted pursuant to those measures under
the protection of the Fourth Amendment. 2
Toward the end of 1968, an FAA committee, including
representatives of the Department of Justice and the Department
of Commerce, developed the first passenger profile.7 3 In December
1968, the FAA organized a conference on the development of
passenger screening devices.74 The airlines and the FAA then
75
combined their efforts to design the first "anti-hijacking system."
However, by 1971 the FAA was no longer content to accept
the airlines' voluntary cooperation.
The FAA recommended
instead a new rule forcing each airline to develop a security
screening plan meeting FAA approval. 6 In 1972, the FAA went
68. Passenger Screening Implementation Report, supra note 10, at 34.
69. Id.
70. See Davis, 482 F.2d at 896-97 (defining what constitutes a government
search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment). When the government
involves itself with a private person whose conduct violates the Fourth
Amendment to such a degree that the private person and the government are

jointly reliant upon each other, it is said to be a "state action." Id. at 897 n.3.
In this situation, even though the government might not actually perform the
search, it does fall within the scope of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 896-97.
71. Id. at 897-98. In 1961, Congress enacted a statute making aircraft
hijacking and activities linked to hijacking federal crimes, and permitted

airlines to deny boarding to anyone the airline believed might pose a threat to
security. Id. at 897-98. In 1968, federal officials, in cooperation with air
carriers, developed search and surveillance techniques. Id. In 1969, when the
number of successful hijackings of U.S. planes had grown to 33 (of 40

attempts), it was the government who entered into international conventions
and undertook domestic action to extinguish the hijacking problem. Id. at
898.
72. Id. at 904.
73. Id. at 898.
74. Id.
75. Davis, 482 F.2d at 898. The system included the use of the passenger
profile, followed by the use of the magnetometer for those matching the profile,
and then a search of passengers who triggered the magnetometer (or a search
of their luggage). Id. The FAA assisted the airlines in the implementation of

the system, even providing United States Deputy Marshals and Customs
Service agents to handle searches and arrests. Id. at 899.
76. Id. at 900. On Feb. 1, 1972, the rule ordering each airline to develop a
security screening plan that met FAA approval was put into practice. Id. The
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one step further by mandating that airlines prevent any passenger
fitting the profile from boarding unless the passenger successfully
passed through a magnetometer or submitted to a "consent search"
before boarding."
B. Voluntary Consent to a Search as a Waiver of Fourth
Amendment Rights
The police may approach and question any individual in a
public place concerning any matter."
They may ask questions,
even offering the individual's voluntary responses as evidence in a
criminal prosecution, as long as the individual is willing to listen
and respond to the officer's questions.7 9 An individual may allow
the police to go further, consenting to a search of the individual's
person or effects, or producing identification upon the officer's
request without triggering any Fourth Amendment protection."
Fourth Amendment protection arises only when the police
insinuate that "compliance with their requests is required,"8' or
that the individual is not free to leave.82 The standard for
determining when a mere request for information rises to the level
of a seizure is whether a reasonable person would feel free to
refuse to comply or to completely end the conversation with the

airlines were given 72 hours to implement a plan and convince the FAA that it
would be effective in screening baggage and passengers for weapons. Id.
Under the rule, the airlines were to subject each passenger to a passenger
profile, magnetometer screening, identification check, hand search, or a
combination of these. Id.
77. Id. at 901. The government further provided armed law enforcement
officers authorized to arrest individuals "under Federal, State, or other
political subdivision authority." Id. at 902. These officers were responsible for
the supervision of the airline personnel as they performed the security
screening procedure. Id.
78. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991). The officer need not have
any suspicion of wrongdoing to question an individual as long as the
questioning is consensual. Id.
79. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983). See also Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 20 n.16 (1968) (distinguishing mere questioning from a seizure under
Fourth Amendment standards). All interactions between policemen and
citizens do not rise to the level of a seizure of the citizen. Id. However, the
moment the officer uses physical force or invokes his authority, such that the
citizen does not feel free to leave, the interaction becomes a "seizure" under
Fourth Amendment standards. Id.
80. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434-35. See United States v. Legato, 480 F.2d 408,
413 (5th Cir. 1973) (noting that consent must be "an intelligent
relinquishment of a known right or privilege" to qualify as a legitimate waiver
of Fourth Amendment rights). Cf. People v. Heimel, 812 P.2d 1177, 1180-81
(Colo. 1991) (noting that when an individual consents to a search, the police
officer need not justify the search by any showing of probable cause or
reasonable suspicion).
81. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 435.

82. Id.
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officer.8 3
This determination is made by considering the
individual's response in light of the totality of circumstances.8
The courts carefully scrutinize consent searches to avoid
condoning official coercion.85
Implied consent is one way in which the government uses the
consent theory to justify airport searches.86 This theory is based
on the idea that passengers approaching security checkpoints can
clearly see that passing through the checkpoint may result in a
search of their belongings or person. Their continuation through
the checkpoint is a manifestation of their implied consent to the
search.88 In electing to fly, a passenger is, in effect, consenting to
some level of interrogation and searching. 89 Passengers must
weigh their Fourth Amendment interests against their need for

83. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114 n.5 (1984).

The term

seizure is defined here as a "meaningful interference, however brief, with an

individual's freedom of movement." Id. Accord Bostick, 501 U.S. at 435-36.
84. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 437. The relevant factors for proving voluntariness
which must be considered as a whole are:
voluntariness of the defendant's custodial status, the presence of
coercive police procedure, the extent and level of the defendant's
cooperation with police, the defendant's awareness of his right to refuse
to consent to the search, the defendant's education and intelligence, and
significantly, the defendant's belief that no incriminating evidence will
be found.
United States v. Chemaly, 741 F.2d 1346, 1352 (11th Cir. 1984).
Voluntariness is determined by weighing all of these factors, but stronger
indications of coercion, such as the retention of travel documents or
identification weigh more heavily. Id. An individual's ignorance of his right to
refuse the search may also be indicative .of implied coercion. Id. at 1353.
Other highly decisive factors in determining whether police behavior is
coercive are blocking an individual's path, impeding his progress, or keeping
him from proceeding on his way. United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583, 597
(5th Cir. 1982). Also, if an officer focuses on a specific person in a crowd of
many, that individual may be justified in believing that cooperation with the
officer is required. Id. Some factors that might suggest a seizure, even when
the individual did not try to leave, are as follows: the intimidating presence of
more than one officer, an obvious weapon about the person of one of the
officers, the police officer's tone of voice and words chosen, or physical touching
of the individual. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980). A
defendant may have the impression that he or she is not free to leave as a
result of the environment in which the questioning takes place. United States
v. Ruiz-Estrella, 481 F.2d 723, 728 (2d Cir. 1973). The court in Ruiz-Estrella
rejected the consent theory, finding the defendant was only obeying apparent
lawful authority when he was questioned in an enclosed stairwell with only
himself and the questioner present. Id.
85. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 229 (1973).
86. McGann v. Northeast Ill. Reg'l Commuter R.R. Corp., 8 F.3d 1174, 1179
(7th Cir. 1993).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Derocher, supra note 32, at 46.
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convenience. 90 In a random search situation, however, "this choice
is no choice at all."91
92
The consent theory may apply to a magnetometer search,
but physical searches pursuant to passenger profile matches
cannot be based on implied consent. The level of intrusiveness of a
magnetometer search simply does not compare to that of a
physical search,93 handcuffing 4 or "the dumping of luggage onto
Nothing prepares passengers for the
floors of public areas."99
possibility they may be chosen because something in their
96
There is no
demeanor suggests they might be a terrorist.

90. Id.
91. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 450 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In Florida v.
Bostick, police engaged in a random sweep of a bus that revealed contraband
in the defendant's luggage. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 429. The court found that the
defendant's sense of detention was the product of his decision to take the bus,
not the nature of the police questioning. Id. at 436. Justices Marshall,
Blackmun, and Stevens dissented, noting that this interpretation of the facts
effectively made the defendant responsible for his own feeling of confinement.
Bostick, 501 U.S. at 449 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Obviously, a person's 'voluntary decision' to place himself in a room with
only one exit does not authorize the police to force an encounter upon
him by placing themselves in front of the exit. It is no more acceptable
for the police to force an encounter on a person by exploiting his
'voluntary decision' to expose himself to perfectly legitimate personal or
social constraints.
Id. at 450. The dissent concluded that suspicionless searches put passengers
in the difficult position of either cooperating with the police or leaving the bus
in what may be an unfamiliar or dangerous area, where they could be left
behind if the bus leaves. Id. This rationale would, presumably, extend to
trains, airports, or any other mode of transport that could strand a passenger
in an unfamiliar location. "It is exactly because this 'choice' is no choice at all
that police engage in this technique." Id. "This is not Hitler's Berlin nor
Stalin's Moscow, nor is it white supremacist South Africa. Yet, in Broward
County, Florida, these police officers approach every person on board buses
and trains and check identification and tickets, and ask to search luggage, all
in the name of 'voluntary cooperation'...." Id. at 443. See also United States
v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 807 n.14 (2d Cir. 1974) (reasoning that to force a
passenger to choose between a necessity of modern living, airplane travel, and
a constitutional right is coercion).
92. United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 771 (4th Cir. 1972). A person
would not generally even be aware of a magnetometer search because the
invasion is so minimal. Id.
93. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1968). Without question, a police
officer's public search of an individual who is powerless to resist cannot be
called a "petty indignity." Id. It is an embarrassing, humiliating intrusion
that must not be treated lightly. Id.
94. Husseini, supra note 2, at C3.
95. Council on American-Islamic Relations, supra note 16, at *1.
96. But see Albarado, 495 F.2d at 807 (noting that a general search
conducted in an airport setting is commonplace and not overly intrusive). Just
because many people must endure the humiliation of a stop and frisk does not
mitigate the invasiveness of the search, but it is less offensive to be one of an
entire group that is subjected to the procedure. Id. If only a few individuals
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checkpoint to pass through, no beeping noise or red light to explain
their detention. The security personnel cannot even publicly
articulate a set of factors leading to the conclusion that a
particular passenger might be dangerous.97
The average passenger submits to the magnetometer because
he or she knows that, at worst, the security personnel will impose
an inconvenient delay while the passenger removes the spare
pocket change or keys that may be causing the magnetometer to
go off.9 It is precisely the objective nature of the search that
makes it reasonable. 99 The minimal flexibility that security
personnel have in implementing the magnetometer search protects
passengers from arbitrary and unnecessarily intrusive searches.0 0
The security personnel are not exercising their own independent
judgment.101 The invasion is minimal and the search is limited to
dangerous devices.102 No such objectivity protects the passenger
who is the victim of an overzealous security person with free reign
to conduct any manner of arbitrary search as long as it is based on
a few random factors that coincide with a profile. °3
In Klarfeld v. United States,0 4 the court found the use of the
magnetometer to be justified in part because everyone is subjected

are selected to be searched, those chosen are stigmatized. Id.
97. United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1086 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). In
this case, the factors that comprised the profile used to classify the defendant
were reviewed in camera because if any of the factors that comprise the
terrorist profile were revealed, the entire system would be jeopardized.

Id.

Terrorists would change their behavior and appearance to avoid detection. Id.
98. Klarfeld v. United States, 962 F.2d 866, 867 (9th Cir. 1992) (denial of en

banc review) (Kozinski, J., dissenting). Going through a magnetometer is
described as "a bother," "a nuisance," "a pain in the neck." Id. Most travelers
tolerate it without complaint, though, because the effectiveness of the
magnetometer as a deterrent substantially outweighs the burden on the

passenger. Id.
99. Id. at 869-70.
100. Id. at 869.
101. Id.
Limiting security personnel to objective procedures and
constitutional requirements guarantees the effectiveness of the security
procedure. Id. When security personnel have less flexibility in implementing

the procedures, they are less likely to misuse their authority. Id.
102. See United States v. Pulido-Baquerizo, 800 F.2d 899, 902 (9th Cir. 1986)
(stating that this privacy intrusion is one that society is willing to permit
because it is a relatively minor intrusion, limited in scope, and minimally
embarrassing).
103. Klarfeld, 962 F.2d at 867 (denial of en banc review) (Kozinski, J.,

dissenting). Administrative and consent searches are not instituted for
general law enforcement purposes. Id. Police officers avoid Fourth
Amendment scrutiny only when the security screening is geared toward
ensuring the safety of passengers. Id. When security officers move outside

these parameters, such as when they search for evidence of drug trafficking,
they are operating in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id.

104. 962 F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1992).
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0 5
There is a commonality of experience that
to the magnetometer."
Individuals are not
renders the invasion less embarrassing.'
singled out because the security person dislikes them or wants to
embarrass them. °7 The search is further justified by the fact that
it does not involve the disclosure of personal information, or give
security personnel authority to search for contraband, and it does
not give them a chance to examine passengers' personal effects.'08
Passenger profiling gives security personnel this unacceptable
level of authority.

C. The "Terry"Stop As A Limitation On FourthAmendment
Rights
Airport searches are also justified according to the standards
set out in Terry v. Ohio.'0 9 Police officers are forced to deal with
unpredictable situations during encounters with citizens on city
streets, and they generally have very little time to effectively
evaluate the potential for danger." 0 In Terry, the Supreme Court
empowered the police to frisk individuals suspected of carrying
weapons."' This decision was predicated upon the practical and
constitutional arguments that balance the grave danger the police
are exposed to every day against the minor inconvenience to the
individual of a pat down search."'
Acknowledging that the Fourth Amendment requires a
substantial basis in reason for any invasion of an individual's
protected privacy interest,1' the Court imparted this power upon
the police with the restriction of reasonableness."4 An officer's
"inarticulate hunches,"". even if based on good faith, are not
105. Id. at 870.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
standards.

See supra note 66 for an elaboration of the

110. Terry, 392 U.S. at 10.

111. Id. at 30. A frisk is a limited search for weapons, not to be confused
with an actual arrest. Id. at 26-27. A frisk is merely a brief invasion of an
individual's privacy. Id. An officer may stop and briefly question an
individual based on a reasonable suspicion that the individual may be engaged
in criminal activity. Id. If the officer develops a concern that the individual

may be armed, then the officer may frisk the individual for a weapon. Id. If
the "stop" and "frisk" give rise to probable cause and an implication the

individual has committed a crime, then the officer may arrest and fully search
the individual. Id. at 10.
112. Id. at 10-11.
113. Id. at 19-21.
114. Id. at 21-22. The reasonableness of the officer's decision to search an
individual is determined according to an objective standard. Id. An officer
must act as a reasonably cautious person would under the particular

circumstances of the search. Id.
115. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22.
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enough to warrant a "Terry" stop.11 To warrant the intrusion, the
police officer must be able to indicate specific facts from which it
may be reasonably inferred that the intrusion is justified." 7
Evidence that police obtain outside the very narrow confines of a
"Terry" search is not admissible in court."' This ensures that
police officers use the "Terry" search only for the limited purpose
for which it is intended. 119

The specific and articulable facts upon which an officer bases
a "Terry" search amount to a substitution for the probable cause
element necessary for a search under the Fourth Amendment.'
This exception relies upon a balancing of the extent of the
intrusion on a persons Fourth Amendment interests against the
governmental interest intended to justify the intrusion. 12 ' Terry
demands that an officer have at least some articulable reason for
searching an individual specifically to safeguard against abuses of
this Fourth Amendment exception. 212 Furthermore, the scope of
the search must be confined to acts reasonably calculated to
uncover weapons.123
A profile cannot automatically act as a substitute for the
necessary reasonable suspicion upon which a "Terry" stop is
predicated. 124

behavior. 2 1
116. Id.

Suspicion

must

stem

from

an

individual's

It is not enough that an individual resemble some

If reasonableness were determined by a subjective, good faith

standard, the protections of the Fourth Amendment would be rendered
worthless. Id.
117. Id. at 21.
118. Id. at 29. If an officer knows that evidence obtained through an
unlawful search will always be rejected in court, the officer will make an

earnest effort to obtain evidence within the confines of the Fourth
Amendment. Id.
119. Id.
120. Terry, 392 U.S. at 35 (Douglas, J., dissenting). A search or seizure can

only be constitutional under Fourth Amendment standards if an officer has
probable cause to believe that an individual has been, is, or will be involved in
criminal activity. Id. Probable cause refers to an officer's reasonable belief
that a crime is being committed. Id. at n.1.
121. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983). Cf. United States v.
Cyzewski, 484 F.2d 509, 517 (5th Cir. 1973) (Thornberry, J., dissenting)
(cautioning against allowing every search justified in the name of terrorism).
Historically, the right to privacy was assumed, and police needed special
justification to search an individual. Id. Now, as society puts more emphasis

on the potential for danger, the disruption is assumed, and privacy is the
exception. Id. The need for security certainly justifies greater intrusions upon
our Fourth Amendment rights, but we must be wary of stressing the potential
for danger when applying the Fourth Amendment reasonableness test. Id. at

517-18.
122. United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583, 601 n.22 (5th Cir. 1982).
123. Terry, 392 U.S. at 26.

124. Berry, 670 F.2d at 600-01.
125. Id. at 600. A legitimate search must be based on some morsel of
individualized suspicion to be considered lawful or constitutional. Id.
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vague sketch of a terrorist.126 A profile does not focus on the
individual person and situation," 7 and therefore cannot be a
reasonable substitute for probable cause. 28
Terry does not
authorize the indiscriminate pat down29 of arbitrarily selected
individuals to suppress criminal activity.1
D. The Administrative Search Exception to the Fourth
Amendment
Another Fourth Amendment exception that applies to the
airport setting is the exception for administrative searches.'0
Administrative searches are "searches conducted as part of [an
administrative] scheme in furtherance of an administrative
purpose, rather than as part of a criminal investigation..
,,,""
In
the airport context, the essential purpose of the administrative
scheme is not to actually arrest people who carry weapons, but to
guarantee airport safety and make sure passengers do not board
the plane with weapons.132
Like "Terry" stops, administrative searches must meet the

126. Id. at 601. An officer cannot simply refer to a directory of suspicious
behavior to determine whether a search or seizure is warranted. Id. at 600-01.
Some reliance upon facts specific to the individual is required. Id.
127. Id. A profile may, under some circumstances, provide grounds for a
search. Id. An officer, in light of his knowledge and experience, must point to
specific characteristics grounded in the particular circumstances that lead the
officer to conclude an individual is involved in criminal activity. Id. If the
officer is able to do this, the fact that the characteristic also happens to appear
on a profile does not diminish its value as justification for the stop. Id. See
also United States v. Legato, 480 F.2d 408, 411 (5th Cir. 1973) (finding that
the "Terry" search applies to airport situations and further noting that a more
intrusive search might be necessary than that which is authorized by Terry v.
Ohio). This search is constitutional if based on a specific set of facts that
would lead a reasonable officer to believe that the individual searched is
armed and a threat to security. Id.
128. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 13 (1989) (Marshall, J., and
Brennan, J., dissenting). An officer needs to be free to make decisions in light
of his knowledge and ability. Id. Forcing an officer to rely on a list of
behavioral factors in deciding whom to detain restricts his ability to make on
the spot decisions based on experience. Id.
129. United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 908 (9th Cir. 1973). If the
requirement that police officers be able to articulate specific facts as a
justification for a search were abandoned, there would be no limitation on the
power of the police. Id. at 907. There is no indication the threat of concealed
weapons is more pervasive in an airport environment. Id. at 907-08.
130. See supra note 67 for a general discussion of administrative searches.
131. Davis, 482 F.2d at 908. See also United States v. Soyland, 3 F.3d 1312,
1316 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (stating that administrative
searches are general searches that require no suspicion of wrongdoing and
generally no warrant). Id. Administrative searches are predicated wholly on
the urgent need for the search coupled with very strict limitations designed to
insure that the search is narrowly focused on fulfilling that need. Id.
132. Davis, 482 F.2d at 908 n.41.
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reasonableness.133
of
requirement
Amendment
Fourth
Administrative searches also resemble "Terry" stops in that the
scope of the search must be narrowly limited to the circumstances
that justify their existence.13 4 When the administrative search
moves outside of these narrow parameters, it becomes violative of
the Fourth Amendment. 135 Security personnel are authorized to
conduct administrative searches precisely because the search is
inflexible and narrowly confined in scope.'36 These searches are
indiscriminate because there is no way to isolate the specific
offenders, so the security personnel do not focus on particular
individuals.'37 Administrative searches also give passengers the
option of conceding to the search or choosing not to board the
plane.'
Where there is an indication that law enforcement
officials may be operating outside the scope of the administrative
search, 3courts
have an affirmative responsibility to inquire
9
further. '
For example, if security personnel in airports use
administrative searches as an excuse to search passengers for
evidence of other criminal activities that do not involve a threat to
passenger safety, they are acting beyond the scope of the
administrative search. 40 The high percentage of airport searches
that uncover drugs as compared to weapons might suggest such an
abuse of the administrative search exception.'
There is an
obvious overlap between the drug courier profile and the terrorist
profile, supposedly two very different profiles. 4 ' "It is passing
strange that most of these airport searches find narcotics and not
bombs, which might cause us to pause in our rush toward
malleating the Fourth Amendment in order to keep bombs from

133. Id. at 910. See also People v. Heimel, 812 P.2d 1177, 1181 (Colo. 1991)
(noting that administrative searches are conducted pursuant to matters of
compelling governmental importance). An administrative search program

must be reasonably applied to support the governmental interest for which it
was created with minimal intrusion upon the privacy interest of those being
searched. Id. The risk here is the lives of hundreds of people and the cost of
millions of dollars of property. Id. This risk is certainly a valid rationalization

for an administrative search as long as the search is conducted in good faith
with the intention of minimizing the risk. Id.
134. Davis, 482 F.2d at 910.
135. Soyland, 3 F.3d at 1316 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
136. Klarfeld v. United States, 962 F.2d 866, 869 (9th Cir. 1992) (denial of en
banc review) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
137. Davis, 482 F.2d at 907.
138. Id. at 913. If the passenger chooses to proceed with the search, the

passenger has effectively consented to the government search. Id.
139. Soyland, 3 F.3d at 1319 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).

140. Id. at 1316.
141. Id.
142. See supra note 12 for a comparison of the terrorist profile and the drug
courier profile.
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exploding."143 Searches pursuant to the identification of a possible
terrorist through the use of terrorist profiles are warranted by our
great concern for the safety of passengers and crew members."'
This concession of an individual's Fourth Amendment rights is
predicated upon the tremendous threat to life and property posed
by an armed terrorist on board a plane, and the vulnerable
position of all involved. 4 ' In the airport setting, a search based on
anything less is outside the scope of the administrative search
exception to the Fourth Amendment. 4 '
A growing body of case law indicates that security personnel
are using administrative searches to confiscate contraband.'4 7 Our
Fourth Amendment rights are compromised when searches,
conducted under the pretext of ensuring security, are used instead
to uncover contraband. 4 8 Though we may be willing to acquiesce
to an improper search in the airport setting, the question becomes
how to limit the infringement of our rights. The police could
certainly wage a more effective war on drugs if they were
permitted to make use of the drug courier profile in specific urban
neighborhoods, where individuals involved in the sale of drugs are
known to reside. 4 '

143. United States v. Legato, 480 F.2d 408, 414 (5th Cir. 1973) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring).
144. People v. Heimel, 812 P.2d 1177, 1181 (Colo. 1991).
145. Id.
146. Soyland, 3 F.3d at 1316 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
147. See id. at 1317 (citing an instance of abuse of administrative searches).
The United States Customs Service and the Seattle Port Police had a program
rewarding security personnel for finding drugs or large amounts of money. Id.
The court noted that officers may open packages more frequently than they
might have otherwise because they want to receive the reward. Id. Whereas,
when their only motivation is the detection of firearms and explosives, officers
have no reason to search a package unless they believe it might conceal a
dangerous item. Id. See also Davis, 482 F.2d at 909 n.43 (quoting Frank
Carman, Director of Security for Pan American World Airways, commenting
that the security personnel have "shaken down people" that they considered
"thoroughly undesirable to have aboard an airplane, but are not basically
hijackers"). Mr. Carman further commented on the frequency with which
security personnel were making drug related arrests, describing it as a daily
event. Id.
148. United States v. Skipwith, 482 F. 2d 1272, 1279 (5th Cir. 1973)
(Aldrich, J., dissenting). Judge Aldrich suggests that, to discourage security
personnel from conducting pretextual searches, the court should exclude
evidence of contraband (other than weapons) when the airport searches could
not have been independently directed toward uncovering weapons. Id.
149. Id. at 1275 n.4. Necessity alone cannot justify all non-probable cause
searches. Id.
The court has never allowed random police searches in a
particular high crime area, even if such a procedure would result in a decrease
in the amount of crime in the area. Id.

188
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III. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PASSENGER PROFILING AS A SAFETY
MEASURE

The Fourth Amendment analysis of a search does not end
with balancing the compelling need for the search against its
intrusiveness."" If the search procedure is not fairly certain to be
effective in preventing the danger, then it is not reasonable,
though it may be necessary and relatively unintrusive."' Profiles
are not effective, in part, because many harmless passengers
might fit the profile exactly. 52' If security personnel are free to use
a few factors plucked from an exhaustive profile as a basis for
searching passengers, many innocent travelers will be left
vulnerable to random searches. 5 ' Profiles have a "chameleon-like"
way of conforming to any situation. 54
The fundamental deficiency of our current passenger
screening system is poor operator performance.15' Airport security
operators have challenging jobs and they work in a stressful work
environment for about the same amount of money they could
expect to make at a fast-food restaurant."6 These conditions lead
to high turnover which is, in itself, a central aspect of the
problem.'57 However, it is not simply a matter of low wages."58
Other factors conspire to make airport security screening positions
decidedly unattractive. 59 Lack of training and a high turnover
rate lead to ineffective passenger screening procedures. 6
Furthermore, ineffectiveness of the procedures is enhanced when
supervisors pressure operators to work faster. 16 In the airport
150. Id. at 1275.

151. Id.
152. Id. at 1280 n.1 (Aldrich, J., dissenting).
153. See Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 440-41 (1980) (finding the use of

certain characteristics of drug courier profiles to be an insufficient

substitution for the objective justification governing searches and seizures).
154. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 13-14. A number of cases have relied on conflicting
factors in supporting passenger profiles. Id. Some examples are: suspect was
first to deplane; suspect was last to deplane; suspect deplaned from the
middle; suspect purchased one-way tickets; suspect purchased round-trip

tickets; suspect's flight was nonstop; suspect changed planes; suspect carried
no luggage; suspect carried a gym bag; suspect had new suitcases; suspect
traveled alone; suspect traveled with someone else; suspect acted nervously;

and suspect acted too calmly. Id.
155. Passenger Screening Implementation Report, supra note 10, at 24.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 24-25. Factors such as the individual's compatibility with the job,
opportunity for advancement, development of knowledge and skills, feedback

and recognition of performance, status of the job, physical work environment,
and social opportunities and activities render the job unattractive to potential
and existing employees even if the compensation is attractive. Id.
160. Id.
161. Passenger Screening Implementation Report, supra note 10, at 25.
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environment, such pressure to increase operator speed is obviously
ever present.
These same operators have very broad authority to decide
which passenger's baggage to search.162 Customs officers or other
law enforcement officials at the airport may offer generous
rewards to the security screening operators for information
regarding the identity of passengers carrying large sums of
currency or evidence of crime. 163 These rewards may prove so
alluring that the operators spend more time and energy focusing
on personal payoffs rather than air safety." 4 This, in turn, may
impair their already limited effectiveness in securing airplane
safety and cause unnecessary delays.16 The delay and confusion
might assist an actual terrorist in moving through the airport
undetected. This state of affairs eliminates the justification for
airport administrative searches because the searches are not an
effective means of controlling the narrow exigency on which they
are based. 166
IV. A PASSENGER'S REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY
Whatever types of security measures we concede to now, we
must be prepared to live with long into the future.167 Though these
security measures develop in response to an immediate crisis, they
remain after the crisis subsides in anticipation that it may
resurface.166 Eventually, there may be no threat to necessitate an
intrusive security measure.16 The security measure will become
merely a way of life.
Already, evidence of such concessions abound. Surveillance
cameras monitor unsuspecting workers in their locker room at a
Boston hotel as they sit half-naked, exchanging small talk. 70 New
162. United States v. $124,570 U.S. Currency, 873 F.2d 1240, 1245 (9th Cir.
1989).
163. Id.
164. Id. at 1245-46. See United States v. Soyland, 3 F.3d 1312, 1317
(Kozinski, J., dissenting). When security personnel have the desire to locate
weapons and explosives as their only motivation, the traveling public can rely
on their judgment because they have no ulterior motive for searching baggage.

Id. On the other hand, when agents have a dual objective, they may choose to
search a passenger's baggage in hopes of earning a reward or the respect of

their supervisors. Id.
165. $124,570 U.S. Currency, 873 F.2d at 1246.

166.
167.
168.
169.

Id.
United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 805 (2d Cir. 1974).
Id.
Id.

170. Marla Van Schuyver, Privacy at Work? Don't Expect it[,j It's Often Data
Versus Dignity, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 4, 1993, at A3. The Society for Human

Resource Management administered a survey to its members in 1991 and
found that 11% of the 1,493 employers who responded used video cameras to
watch workers, 8% monitored computer terminals, and 5% tapped telephone
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Yorkers can expect to be photographed twenty times a day by
surveillance cameras if they live and work in the city. 7 ' The latest
technological advancement that police are using to fight crime is
"thermal imaging" which allows them to monitor heat levels from
buildings.172 Now the police no longer have to rely on outdated
methods of ferreting out drug dealers, such as sifting through
garbage, watching suspected drug houses from airplanes, and
tapping phone lines, though these tried and true methods
certainly will not be discarded.173 When suspects leave their
homes, police in some states are free to attach an electronic
vehicle-monitoring device to their car without even obtaining a
search warrant." 4 Or perhaps the police would prefer to use an
infrared scanner identical to those used in the Gulf War to focus
on the suspect even in the dead of night. 7 '
Not surprisingly, much of the technology used by the police is
developed in the airport setting in response to "emergency
situations."17
One such advancement presently under
consideration for airport use is imaging technology that would
scan for articles under multiple layers of clothing. 77
This
contraband detection system would detect metallic and
nonmetallic weapons, explosives and other contraband. 7 It would
also detect the relative dimensions of breasts or a penis, catheter
tubes and bags, evidence of mastectomies,
colostomy devices,
179
prosthetic limbs and penile implants.
Perhaps the most frightening privacy infringement of all is

lines. Id.
171. Joshua Quittner, Invasion of Privacy, TIME, Aug. 25, 1997, at 28, 31.
172. Ted Cilwick, Ruling Cost Utah Cops a High-Tech Weapon, Court Pours
Water on Heat Sensor, SALT LAKE TRIB., April 8, 1996, at Al. The strong
lighting that is needed to grow marijuana plants will produce varying degrees
of heat in a building. Id. The thermal imager combines the technology of a
35mm camera and a camcorder to detect this heat. Id. When it is aimed at a
building, if differing temperatures are permeating the walls of the building,

sharp coinciding gradations of light will appear in the viewfinder. Id. The

thermal imager allows the government to "see through" the walls of the home.

Id.
173. Id.
174. On the Wrong Track, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Jan. 15, 1997, at B06.
175. Jonathan S. Landay, Police Tap High-Tech Tools Of Military to Fight
Crime; Guns That Shoot Nets, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, April 2, 1997, at 1.
This type of military technology is particularly frightening to legal experts
who believe that allowing the police to use military technology further blurs
the distinction between police and soldiers. Id.

176. Klarfeld v. United States, 962 F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1992) (denial of en
banc review) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).

Courthouses and other government

buildings use magnetometers. Id.
177. Passenger Screening Implementation Report, supra note 10, at 14.

178. Id.
179. Nojeim, supra note 11, at *10.
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the result of computer interconnectedness.'8" For years, marketing
and insurance companies have collected personal information on
databases. 8' Governments have gathered information as well for a
number of necessary reasons, such as paying Social Security
benefits, operating public schools and regulating commerce and
national defense. 8 Airport security officials have longed for the
day when they would have access to these databases for the
purpose of singling out potential terrorists. 183
The Gore Commission has proposed a passenger screening
database system that would work to make passenger profiles more
personal." The database would single out certain passengers and
enable authorities to obtain personal financial information."' The
Commission proposes the use of other databases such as those of
the United States Customs Service and automated law
enforcement databases, 8 6 including those of the FBI, CIA, and the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms.'87 The Commission
proposed these steps despite the FBI's acknowledgment that
thirty-three percent of the criminal record data stored in its
database is erroneous. 8 Passengers would not be aware of the
procedure unless they were singled out as potential terrorists. 8 9
During his term, President Clinton successfully passed laws
setting up four such databases. 98 Civil libertarians and computer
180. Quittner, supra note 171, at 31.
181. George Griffin, The Fight Is On; Battle Lines Drawn Over High-Tech
Invasion of Privacy, TELEGRAM & GAZETTE, Oct. 27, 1996, at Al.
182. Id.
183. Davis, 482 F.2d at 909 n.43 (quoting the testimony of FAA
Administrator Schaffer during the Aircraft Hijacking Hearings). As early as
the 1970's, the FAA has had access to law enforcement information, and a
desire to use the information to target passengers for more intense screening.
Id. The system would be activated when a person called to make a
reservation, giving their name and other personal information to the
reservationist. Id. Past criminal records, warrants, or information regarding
the person's sinister reputation would be a signal to security personnel that
the person should be subjected to heightened security measure. Id. The FAA
even had hopes of obtaining medical records, both physical and psychological.
Id.
184. Mindy Blodgett, Terrorism Bill Pits Safety vs. Privacy, COMPUTER
WORLD, Oct. 7, 1996, at A4.
185. Gary Delsohn & Cynthia Hubert, How Liberty's Rules Get FracturedIn
The Quest For Security, SACRAMENTO BEE, Dec. 4, 1996, at Al.
186. Nojeim, supra note 11, at *4.
187. Derocher, supra note 32, at 42.
188. Id.
189. Roberto Suro, New Airport Bomb Plan Considered; Computer Profiles,
High-Tech Detectors Central to System, WASH. POST, Aug. 31, 1996, at A01.
190. Nojeim, supra note 11, at *8. The other databases include a national
worker database used by the Immigration and Naturalization Service to
identify newly-hired persons, a national worker database used to identify
parents who have failed to pay child support, a national patient database used
to follow the health care history of all United States citizens, and a national
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professionals are concerned that information such as medical and
criminal background and even political affiliation could be
included in the database."' Privacy advocates are concerned about
who would have access to the information, and what airline
employees would maintain the database. 9 ' A system whereby
personal data would be maintained and used by any number of
airline personnel is rife with privacy concerns.'93 Dishonest airline
employees could use the database for money-making schemes. 94
The probability of error increases as the system becomes connected
to other databases and is continuously updated.' 9" If correcting
inaccuracies in airline databases is anything like trying to correct
an inaccuracy on one's credit report, 96the ramifications could be
truly disastrous and a threat to safety.
The court in United States v. McDonald 97 reasoned that
travelers on a common carrier, like those walking down a public
street, have a lower expectation of privacy than a person within
the privacy of his home."98
This is an unacceptable
rationalization.' 99 For example, the government is not free to
simply announce that all telephone lines will be tapped, and to
justify this decision by claiming that the public has no expectation
to privacy on the telephone because of its awareness of the phone
tap."'0 The Constitution affords citizens the right to demand that
government intrusion be as limited as possible, consistent with the
need to protect against threats to public safety. 2 1 In 1971, the
court in United States v. Lopez"' foresaw the negative possibilities
of passenger profiling.'
In a section of its decision entitled
"Disquieting Implications of the System," the court noted that
"[e]mploying a combination of psychological, sociological and
physical sciences to screen, inspect and categorize unsuspecting
citizens raises visions of abuse in our increasingly technological
society."" 4 The court went on to note that what anti-utopians like
Huxley and Orwell have prophesied could come to bear on future
generations.' These despotisms would be far more powerful than
database of sex offenders. Id.
191. Blodgett, supra note 184, at A4.
192. Nojeim, supra note 11, at *8.
193. Id.
194. Blodgett, supra note 184, at A4.
195. Nojeim, supra note 11, at *8.
196. Id.
197. 100 F.3d 1320 (7th Cir. 1996).
198. Id. at 1324-25.
199. United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 806 (2d Cir. 1974).
200. Id.

201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Id.
328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
Id. at 1100.
Id.
Id.
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their critics could have imagined, though,2"6 "for they will be
equipped with techniques of inner-manipulation as unobtrusively
fine as gossamer." °7
V. REEXAMINING THE METHOD OF PROFILING

Profiling need not be entirely abolished, but it must be
reinvented and carefully monitored. Airport employees, airlines
and the FAA must be made to answer to a panel of civil
libertarians that would monitor complaints and review security
procedures. Psychological, scientific, law enforcement and airline
experts must formulate a new profile that security personnel can
easily and objectively implement without the use of the personal
information contained in databases. Courts must exclude evidence
obtained pursuant to improper searches to ensure the operators
perform only good faith searches for weapons. Ultimately, any
system is only as effective as the people who implement that
system. All airport security personnel must receive better training
and incentives, and have the opportunity to attend refresher
training seminars.
A. Panel to Review Civil Rights Violations
In his statement before the International Conference on
Aviation Safety and Security, Gregory Nojeim suggested a panel
be created to handle complaints concerning offensive security
This panel of civil libertarians would
screening procedures."0
ensure that the rights of individuals were vigorously protected.
The airlines and the FAA would apprise the panel of all new
passenger screening and security programs. The panel would then
have a voice in directing their implementation.
B. The Development of a New Profile
The FAA and the airlines must work in concert with civil
libertarians, law enforcement officials and expert psychologists to
The
develop an effective, easily applied passenger profile.
profiling system that was developed in response to the hijacking
crisis over thirty years ago is no longer applicable to our modern
terrorism concerns. 20 9 Terrorism can no longer be traced to one
210
if it ever could.
geographic source or one particular group,
Airlines and the panel of civil libertarians must monitor the
development of new profile factors and confirm that they are
applied uniformly. Additionally, security personnel must be held
206. Id.

207. Id.
208. Nojeim, supra note 11, at *11.

209. Id. at *5.
210. Id. at *6.
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accountable for their decisions to detain passengers. The airlines
should keep strict records of each passenger detention, to be
periodically reviewed by the civil rights panel. The panel would
review the records to assess the effectiveness of the profiling
system according to a predetermined minimum standard. Failure
to meet the standard would automatically result in the
redevelopment of a new profiling system with updated factors to
reflect societal changes.
The Commission on Aviation Safety and Security's proposal to
collect information about individuals on databases is simply
unacceptable. A security officer's individualized suspicion must be
based on the activities of the passenger as he or she moves
through the airport. The potential for inconvenience (at best) and
disaster (at worst) is simply too great to condone such methods.
C. The Exclusion of All Evidence Not Related to the Search For
Weapons
Judge Aldrich's dissent in United States v. Skipwith, which
called for the exclusion of all evidence not reasonably related to
the search for weapons, offers an excellent method for
discouraging security personnel from performing overzealous
searches. Judge Aldrich suggests that courts adopt the Terry v.
Ohio21 2 approach of excluding evidence obtained in a search
conducted outside the scope of the authorized search.218 If courts
exclude evidence of unrelated crimes, there will be no incentive for
security personnel to use administrative searches as a weapon in
the war on drugs.214 This sound reasoning is applied effectively to
searches pursuant to "Terry" stops to discourage police from
abusing this constitutional exception.
D. Retrain Airport Security Personneland Operators
Most importantly, instead of spending billions of dollars on
the most technologically advanced gadgetry, the government needs
to direct funds toward acquiring top quality security personnel.
These employees need incentives to remain in their jobs, such as
opportunities for advancement, competitive wages and a
reasonable working environment.
Airlines should implement
programs that would reward superior work performance and
immediately reprimand abuses of power.
Most critically, airport security personnel and operators
should participate in ongoing mandatory training classes. Giving
workers a better understanding of their job would limit turnover

211.
212.
213.
214.

482 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir. 1973).
392 U.S. 1 (1968).
Skipwith, 482 F.2d at 1280.
Id. at 1281.
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and increase productivity and effectiveness. If passenger profiles
are going to be used, security personnel must be carefully trained
in the application of the profile and methods for suppressing their
subjective interpretations. Furthermore, all employees should be
trained to effectively handle security situations with an intent to
minimize passenger resentment.
CONCLUSION

As Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu wrote,
"[t]here is apparently a moment of truth in the life of modern
democracies, when it is clear that the unlimited defense of civil
liberties has gone too far and impedes the protection of life and
liberty.""'5 Our nation is facing its moment of truth. We simply
cannot allow our fear of an unknown enemy and our petty
prejudices to blind us to the slow dissolution of our most treasured
constitutional rights. Passenger profiling is merely a symptom of
this dissolution, but a definitive one. Before our civil rights are so
altered as to be unrecognizable, we must invent new methods for
addressing our fears; methods that embody the rights of everyone
and discriminate against no one.

215. Delsohn & Hubert, supra note 185, at Al.

